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 ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has indicated the effect that regulatory jurisdictions have on firm corporate 
governance.  Firms that need to finance investments can reduce their cost of capital by adopting 
stronger regulation by cross-listing their shares in overseas markets.  By taking this idea as a 
point of departure, this study aims to see whether banks can improve governance by expanding 
banking operations into the United States. 
This is measured by examining banks’ loan loss provisions as a mechanism of earnings 
management through an event study.  The event study is structured as a set of cross-sectional 
ordinary least squares over time trying to capture the effect of US financial regulation on 
tendencies to manage earnings via loan loss provisions.  The results are mixed, stemming from 
weak data and limited observations; however, other considerations are taken into account to 
potentially further the study in the future. 
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 Introduction 
Proponents of the bonding hypothesis have recently come up with an alternative 
explanation behind firms’ motivation in cross-listing their shares in foreign stock exchanges.  
They have argued that firms with growth opportunities expand internationally to limit company 
insider and management expropriation (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004).  As international 
entities, these firms will have to submit to tighter regulation and scrutiny to attract lower-cost 
financing for investment projects.  Thus, managers and controlling shareholders have incentive 
to curtail expropriation upon entrance into the new market. 
This argument relies on the implicit assumption that corporate governance varies from 
one regulatory regime to another.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shliefer, and Vishny (2000) have 
shown that the development of financial systems can be evaluated by how well the home country 
can protect outside shareholders.  To put it more specifically, financial development is 
contingent upon how well legal systems can curtail manager and controlling-shareholder 
expropriation.  Expropriation can take many forms; however, it broadly refers to the ability of 
managers and controlling shareholders (here collectively labeled as “insiders”) to extract private 
benefit at the expense of returning investments to outside investors via dividends and higher 
share returns. 
Similar to the set of legal rules and regulations that apply to publicly traded firms in 
general, financial regulation provides rules and regulations that apply specifically to financial 
institutions.  In this setting, financial institutions (henceforth referred to as “banks”) refer 
specifically to those financial firms that take deposits and make loans.  Thus, just as regulatory 
agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) protect investors of publicly 
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traded firms in the United States, agencies like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) seek to protect minority investors of banks (depositors and the public at large). 
  While the recent financial crisis exposed severe flaws within the regulatory systems, most 
advanced economies have in place robust regulatory systems that ensure financial stability, a 
system of prudential supervision focused on the stability of the financial system overall 
(macroprudential supervision), and targeted evaluations of individual financial institutions that 
try to ensure the solvency of said institutions (microprudential supervision) (Borio, 2003).  In 
addition, governmental or quasi-governmental insurance systems serve to protect retail and 
commercial depositors at depository institutions in the wake of a bank run or financial crisis 
(FDIC, 1998).  In the United States, the deposit insurance authority is the FDIC. 
 Given the disparity in financial regulatory regimes for banks, an interesting question to 
address would be to what extent there is a “bonding” phenomenon when banks expand 
internationally into advanced regulatory jurisdictions.   The aim of this question would be to 
study an exact analog of the work done on the bonding hypothesis to explain share cross-listing.  
Amending the theory put forth by Doidge et al. (2004), bank insiders would limit expropriation 
within their own firm to take advantage of growth opportunities that cannot be financed 
internally or through low-risk debt.   
In turn, a bank’s expansion could be a mechanism to anchor market expectations about 
the bank’s financial strength, since it would then be subject to regulation by foreign (and, 
hypothetically, more stringent) financial regulators.  This essay attempts to gauge whether 
expansion into the United States serves as a mechanism to reduce the ability of bank insiders to 
expropriate from minority shareholders.  Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) have shown that for 
commercial and industrial firms, earnings manipulation measures decrease as investor protection 
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increases.  Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) have reinforced these findings by examining banks 
specifically.  This paper adds to this literature by examining whether the act of expanding into 
the United States serves as the driver to achieve better governance through recognizing losses 
more in a more timely manner.  This essay will also include an overview of how foreign banks 
are supervised in the United States, a literature review, methodology and results, and then a 
conclusion. 
History and Scope of Foreign Bank Supervision in the United States 
 While many foreign financial institutions are active in the financial services industry in 
the United States, only those institutions that receive charters from the federal government or 
state government are legally authorized to accept demand deposits.  These institutions generally 
engage in “traditional” banking activities such as accepting deposits and making loans.  Most 
banking activity, however, is concentrated in wholesale lending to firms rather than consumers 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).   
However, foreign banks that have a commercial bank subsidiary in the United States 
often engage in retail banking services, just as any other commercial bank headquartered in the 
United States would.1  As of September 2011, 192 institutions from 59 countries had set up 
operations in the United States, through a variety of entities.  As seen in Table 1, the majority of 
foreign banks originate in highly developed countries in the Asia/Pacific region, such as 
Australia, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, or in Canada and Western Europe. 
 Two important pieces of legislation govern and guide the supervision and regulation of 
foreign banks in the United States.  Passed in 1978, the International Banking Act put procedures 
in place for chartering similar to the existing procedures for domestic commercial banks.  In 
effect, it reinforced the concept of “national treatment,” which gives foreign banks the same 
                                                 
1 Further detail on different entities will follow. 
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powers and the same limitations as their domestic counterparts (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–
06).  More importantly, the International Banking Act compelled the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to be the primary supervisor of foreign banking activity in the United 
States—although the Federal Reserve continues to rely upon the FDIC, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and state banking regulators to perform regular exams in 
this area (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06). 
 The second major piece of legislation covering the supervision of foreign banks in the 
United States, the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA), was passed by the 
United States Congress in 1991.  This act strengthened the role that the Federal Reserve plays in 
overseeing foreign banking activity.  Most importantly, it gave the Federal Reserve the authority 
and responsibility to approve the establishment of any office, branch, or agency in the United 
States. 
Through the process of approval, the FBSEA compelled the Federal Reserve to gauge 
whether the foreign entity was subject to comprehensive supervision in its home country 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  In addition, the foreign entity must make sure that it 
furnishes information germane to the safety and soundness of its U.S. operations as often as the 
Federal Reserve sees fit.  Most importantly, the FBSEA requires that any foreign entity in the 
United States be examined by the Federal Reserve or any other appropriate state or federal 
banking regulator (the OCC, the FDIC, or state banking agencies).  This process requires 
ongoing coordination between the foreign entity and banking regulators.  Moreover, it requires 
that the foreign entity report information on its U.S. activities through quarterly regulatory 
filings.  As such, it is most likely the primary avenue through which the bonding effect takes  
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Country Name Number of Institutions
Japan 18
Germany 16
Taiwan 13
Spain 10
South Korea 9
Canada 7
Brazil 6
China 6
United Kingdom 6
France 6
Australia 5
India 5
Belgium 4
Colombia 4
Sweden 4
Switzerland 4
Bahrain 3
Ireland 3
Israel 3
Italy 3
Phil ippines 3
Singapore 3
Thailand 3
The Netherlands 3
Austria 2
Chile 2
Ecuador 2
Hong Kong 2
Indonesia 2
Luxembourg 2
Portugal 2
Turkey 2
UAE 2
Venezuela 2
Argentina 1
Azerbaijan 1
Bermuda 1
British Virgin Islands 1
Channel  Islands 1
Costa Rica 1
The Dominican Republic 1
Egypt 1
Greece 1
Honduras 1
Jamaica 1
Jordan 1
Kuwait 1
Liberia 1
Malaysia 1
Mexico 1
Nigeria 1
Norway 1
Pakistan 1
Panama 1
Qatar 1
Saudi  Arabia 1
South Africa 1
Ukraine 1
Uruguay 1
Table 1
Number of foreign banking operations  in the 
United States, by home country
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place, since it requires foreign entities to be overseen by U.S. regulators and disclose information 
that they might not have had to disclose in their home country. 
Types of Institutions 
 There are several types of entities that foreign banks can choose to expand into the 
United States.  All of the entities require approval from the Federal Reserve but have different 
restrictions on their ongoing operations.  Overall, Table 2 shows that foreign banks in the United 
States have 288 distinct entities open in the United States.  The most popular way of expanding 
operations in the United States is through a branch.2 
 As mentioned before, the various entities have different regulations on their business 
practices.  For instance, representative offices, the simplest form of foreign banking operation in 
the United States, can usually only perform representative or administrative functions on behalf 
of the foreign banks.  They usually cannot make any business decisions on foreign banks’ behalf 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  Because of theirlimited powers, representative offices 
receive light oversight by U.S. banking regulators, with bank examinations focusing on whether 
a representative office maintains its operations within its legal parameters 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  In addition, representative offices are not required to 
provide quarterly financial data, as other types of foreign bank entities are. 
 Similar to representative offices, branches are not separate corporate entities from the 
parent bank.  Indeed, they are operational arms of the parent institution.  Unlike representative 
offices however, branches have the ability to engage in banking activities and services, such as 
accepting wholesale and foreign deposits, making loans, and acting as fiduciaries 
                                                 
2 The FBSEA eliminated the eligibility of foreign banks to apply for deposit insurance, although those banks that 
already had deposit insurance were grandfathered into the system. 
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(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  Apart from the few branches that were grandfathered in 
before the implementation of FBSEA, branches cannot accept retail deposits. 
 Branches are less costly to establish than full-fledged subsidiary banks because they do 
not require a separate capital base.  As such, whenever these entities make a loan decision, the 
loan capability is based on the parent bank’s capitalization (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  
Because these entities do not require a separate capital investment and are capable of performing 
most wholesale banking activities, they are the most common type of foreign bank entity.  As of 
September 2011, 124 such branches were functioning in the United States.  For the purposes of 
entry into and operation in the United States, no distinction is made between federal and state 
branches.  Both types of institutions have the same functionality (and limitations), but they are 
supervised by different regulators. 
 Agencies, like branches, are legal extensions of the foreign parent bank.  In general, they 
are active in the same wholesale market as branches are but have limitations on their ability to 
accept deposits of any kind.  Subsidiary banks involve the most cost and planning of any entity 
type in the United States, primarily because they require a separate legal structure (and capital 
investment) in the United States.  As such, they behave exactly as if they were commercial banks 
headquartered in the United States, from the perspective of their business activities and 
regulatory oversight.  As a result, subsidiary banks must have deposit insurance to protect retail 
depositors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06). 
 Edge Act corporations behave similarly to branches and agencies, in that they are not 
separate entities from the foreign bank and are usually concentrated in wholesale banking.  But 
Edge Act corporations’ activities must be explicitly tied to foreign or international activities, an 
additional restriction (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  It must be noted that federal law  
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allows for the chartering of Edge Act corporations, while some states have laws that allow for 
agreement corporations that “agree” with the Fed to limit those corporations’ activities to match 
Country Name Rep. Office Ins. Branch Unin. Branch Agency Subsidiary Bk. Edge Agreement Non‐Dep. Tr. Co. NY Inv. Office Total
Japan 12 0 9 1 4 0 1 0 0 27
Canada 2 0 7 5 5 0 0 4 0 23
Germany 7 0 10 0 1 1 0 1 0 20
Spain 2 0 5 5 5 1 0 0 0 18
Taiwan 1 0 11 2 4 0 0 0 0 18
United Kingdom 4 0 5 1 3 2 1 1 0 17
France 5 0 5 3 1 0 0 2 1 17
South Korea 3 0 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 12
India 2 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 10
Brazil 3 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
China 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Switzerland 3 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 8
Australia 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 6
The Netherlands 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
Ireland 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Belgium 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Colombia 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
Hong Kong 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
Sweden 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Bahrain 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Israel 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
Italy 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Luxembourg 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Philippines 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Singapore 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Thailand 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
Uruguay 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Argentina 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Austria 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Chile 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Ecuador 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Indonesia 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Jamaica 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Norway 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Pakistan 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Panama 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Portugal 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Turkey 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
United Arab Emirates 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Venezuela 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Azerbaijan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bermuda 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
British Virgin Islands 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Channel Islands 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Greece 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Honduras 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jordan 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Kuwait 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Liberia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Malaysia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mexico 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Nigeria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Qatar 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
South Africa 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ukraine 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 2
A list of foreign banking institution types by country.  One bank may have more than one entity type in the United States
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those of an Edge Act corporation.  There are also other entity types, such as New York 
investment offices and non-depository trust companies, but their prevalence is limited relative to 
the overall activity of foreign banks in the United States. 
Approval and Ongoing Supervision 
In addition to the application submitted to the Federal Reserve to open a banking office in 
the United States, foreign banks must also furnish documentation to the appropriate banking 
regulator, depending on the type of institution they wish to open.  For federal branches, agencies, 
and subsidiary banks, foreign banks must also apply with the OCC.  Foreign banks wishing to 
open state branches, agencies, and subsidiary banks must receive approval from the relevant state 
banking authorities.  To receive approval from the Federal Reserve, the foreign bank must show 
that it is subject to the comprehensive supervision of its home country regulator and that it is 
active in banking outside of the United States, as well as provide other financial information the 
Federal Reserve might deem necessary to render judgment. 
 To assess whether the foreign bank receives comprehensive supervision from its home 
country regulator, the Federal Reserve requests materials that the foreign bank submits to its 
home country regulator (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  In certain instances, it sends its 
staff to the home country of the foreign bank to meet with regulators there.  In cases where the 
Federal Reserve cannot make an affirmative decision on the scope of home country supervision, 
foreign banks might elect to set up a representative office or expand via non-bank entities.   
 For foreign banks that wish to open full-fledged subsidiary banks, the process is even 
more involved.  In addition to the assessment of the foreign bank’s domestic regulatory 
oversight, the Federal Reserve also requires that the bank supply it with information detailing its 
proposed business plan, a strategy to be profitable within three years, and an explanation of how 
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the subsidiary bank fits into the foreign parent bank’s overall business objectives within the U.S. 
market.  Moreover, the foreign bank must submit a separate application to the FDIC for deposit 
insurance, upon which the FDIC will make a separate assessment of the bank’s safety and 
soundness (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06).  If the foreign parent bank is acquiring a 
domestic U.S. commercial bank, it must also clear the transaction with the SEC (if the U.S. 
institution is publicly held).  With respect to the bonding hypothesis, the process by which a 
foreign bank enters the United States likely serves as a clear signal of its ability to comply with 
U.S. regulations.  To outsiders, it is a message that the bank has internal controls and processes 
in place to meet the standards set by the Federal Reserve and other U.S. bank regulators. 
 Moreover, as an important step in the approval and supervision process, the Federal 
Reserve must make a determination as to whether the foreign bank parent is adequately 
capitalized in its home country, as stipulated in the Basel Accords.  If the Federal Reserve 
determines that the minimum criteria for “well-capitalized” status is insufficient given the 
foreign parent bank’s risk profile, it may require more capitalization before the foreign bank can 
expand its operations into the United States (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005–06). 
 The primary mechanism that U.S. banking regulators use to assess the strength of the 
parent banks that want to open entities in the United States is through examinations.  While bank 
regulators assign a confidential rating to the U.S. subsidiary’s risk management, operational 
controls, compliance, and asset (ROCA) quality, this rating is disclosed only to the U.S. 
subsidiary, not to the foreign parent bank directly.  The Federal Reserve, however, assesses the 
strength of the parent bank through the assignment of a strength of support assessment (SOSA) 
ranking.  The SOSA ranking, from 1 to 3, gauges the foreign parent bank’s financial condition, 
the quality of regulatory oversight in the home country, the support available to the banking and 
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financial system from the home country government, and the foreign parent bank’s oversight of 
its U.S. operations, as well as the likelihood that the financial troubles of the foreign parent bank 
would affect the performance of the U.S. subsidiary (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2005–06).  The 
Federal Reserve assigns the SOSA ranking after consulting with other banking regulators and 
shares this otherwise confidential ranking with the foreign parent bank.  As such, it is the 
primary tool that U.S. banking regulators have to affect changes to the foreign parent bank. 
Literature Review 
 Scholars from various areas have contributed to researching how and why banks operate 
in foreign countries.  Traditionally, research on banks and their international activity has focused 
on industrial organizations’ concerns about competition and on the role of banks as facilitators of 
cross-country and cross-border currency flows (Aliber, 1984).  More recently, Bernanke (2005) 
and Bernanke, Bertout, DeMarco, and Kamin (2011) have provided a broad characterization of 
financial institutions’ motivations for international financial activity, especially their activity 
during the period leading to the recent financial crisis.  Regarding the specific role that a bank 
plays as an intermediary for financial activities internationally, legal scholars such as Tarullo 
(2008) have shown the importance of creating international regulatory standards to reconcile 
disparate national standards. 
 Perhaps the most suitable point of departure for studying the bonding effect that may 
influence bank behavior when a bank expands into the United States would be to examine the 
law and finance literature.  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shliefer (1997, 1998) have 
suggested that firms from countries with weak legal protections for minority shareholders have 
the greatest percentages of concentrated ownership.  Because these legal systems are weak, the 
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cost of ceding control of the firm and thus becoming a minority shareholder would be relatively 
high, inducing controlling shareholders in these firms to hold on to control at all costs.  
This essay argues that financial regulatory systems can play a similar role to that of legal 
systems at large.  Ball (2001) has demonstrated how regulatory systems affect and influence the 
quality of financial reporting from institutions.  Thus, the act of expanding banking operations 
into the United States is similar to “borrowing” better corporate governance from foreign legal 
jurisdictions (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007).  Stronger corporate governance—in this case, the 
ability of minority shareholders to exert influence over firm decisions—is highly correlated with 
better operating performance and market valuation (Klapper & Love, 2004).  As such, cross-
listings have facilitated ownership divestitures by firm insiders (Ayyagari & Doidge, 2010).  
Moreover, the act of bonding enables firms from weaker regulatory regimes to access capital 
markets more cheaply than if they had not expanded into the United States. 
Managers of firms from weaker regulatory regimes have the ability to distort the financial 
performance of the firm so that they can retain their private benefits (Leuz et al., 2003).  For 
instance, firm insiders can manage the reported earnings of the firm to distort “true” performance 
and in turn keep outsider interference at bay (Leuz et al., 2003).  For firms wishing to expand 
that cannot finance projects internally, the ability to operate in the United States can provide an 
opportunity for them to adopt the regulation and supervisory standards of the host country, 
thereby reducing the cost of capital.  Legal systems play the part of the missing enforcement 
mechanisms, whereby outsiders could potentially replace management or enforce contracts that 
could limit the strength of insider control (La Porta et al., 1998; Nenova, 2000; Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2002).  In complementary research, 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) have reasoned that the quality of accounting 
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information helps outsiders (and minority shareholders) distinguish between good and poor 
performance, management, and investments. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) also provided some tools to help measure the strength of 
financial reporting quality.  A firm’s earnings aggressiveness and whether it deals with the 
timely incorporation of economic gains versus losses in accounting earnings are two of the 
measures.  Lower aggressiveness (or higher earnings conservatism) reduces information 
asymmetry (Bhattacharya et al., 2002).  More timely recognition of losses plays a role in 
corporate governance because it increases the speed by which external users of financial 
statements (like minority shareholders) can make a decision as to how fruitful the investment 
decisions made by management have been.  Thus, a measure of earnings aggressiveness—in this 
case, accounting accruals—serves as a measure of the efficacy of regulatory systems in forcing 
banks to recognize losses in a timely manner. 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) used loan-loss provisions as their measure of earnings 
aggressiveness, since provisions are banks’ largest source of accruals.  Banks also have 
discretion in setting the appropriate level of provisions to guard against future losses.  The 
Federal Reserve, however, requires foreign banks operating in the United States to have effective 
loan-loss review systems in place to adequately identify losses in their loan portfolios 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2005–06).  Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) also examined the validity 
of the conclusions reached by Leuz et al. (2003), who had argued that the financial theory that 
earnings management is inversely related to investor protection can be applied to banks.   Their 
results reinforced the earlier study’s findings. 
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Data and Methodology 
 The Thomson Reuters Worldscope database provides income statements and balance 
sheet data for publicly traded firms worldwide, including financial institutions.  As mentioned 
above, the Federal Reserve lists 192 institutions that have operations inside the United States.  
While most banks have unique parent banks, some do not.  Thus, I sought to include only those 
parent banks that are unique.3  This procedure was done in order to gauge the fullest extent to 
which U.S. banking regulators might have an effect on the financial statement reporting quality 
of the foreign parent bank.  In assigning SOSA rankings, the Federal Reserve assesses the 
strength of top-tier foreign parent banks.   
 Only 109 of those 192 institutions have data available on Datastream.  Of those, I used 
only banks that have data available pre- and post-entry into the United States so that I could test 
the effect of U.S. financial supervision and regulation on their measure of earnings 
aggressiveness.  Datastream reports “base date,” which reflects the earliest date for which data 
exist for a particular bank, and the Federal Reserve reports “date open” from the National 
Information Center (NIC) attributes table, which reports the date on which banks opened their 
U.S. operations.4 This last criterion limits our bank sample to only 22 banks.  From Table 3, it 
can be seen that the 22 banks in the study sample come from a variety of countries, but the 
striking feature is that they are all from advanced economies with regulatory regimes comparable 
to the regulatory system in the United States. 
                                                 
3 For instance, Société Generale (a French bank) has a Swiss subsidiary that has its own representative office in the 
United States.  Only the parent bank, Société Generale, was chosen. 
4 Although “base date” reflects the earliest possible date for data availability in Datastream, I later discovered that 
it does not mean all data will be available from that date onward.  I will discuss this more later. 
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 As mentioned earlier, base date reflects the earliest possible data available in Datastream.  
However, the fields available vary greatly over time.  For instance, it could be the case that 
Datastream started to track share prices for institutions at the base date but did not start to record 
balance sheet and income statement data until much later.  This issue also significantly affected 
the sample size, reducing the sample size from 22 banks to fewer than 10.  The banks used in the 
sample are then normalized so that the time series is made up of years prior to expansion into the 
United States and years since expansion into the United States (as shown in Figure 1).    
Country Number of Institutions
Brazil 1
Germany 1
Italy 1
Japan 4
Luxembourg 1
Netherlands 1
Norway 1
Singapore 1
South Korea 2
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Switzerland 1
Taiwan 5
United Kingdom 1
Table 3
Countries and number of institutions 
that comprise event study sample
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Nonetheless, an abridged version of the model used by Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) was used to 
test the effects on earnings management of foreign banks entering the U.S. market.  The model 
borrows from earlier work from Greenwalt and Sinkey (1988) as well as from Laeven and 
Manjoni (2003).  Because of the limited sample of banks, a limited version of the model was 
used to circumvent matrix rank issues.  Thus, the model that is estimated is: 
௉௥௢௩
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ൌ
஻௘௙௢௥௘ି்௔௫ ா௔௥௡௜௡௚௦
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ൅
஼௛.௜௡ ௅௢௔௡௦
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ൅
௅௢௔௡ି௅௢௦௦ ோ௘௦.
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ൅
ா௤௨௜௧௬
஺௦௦௘௧௦ ൅ ሺܩܦܲ ܩݎሻ ൅ ߝ   
The variables are for each year available in the event study sample, for each bank at each year 
available.  Before-tax earnings (earnings before taxes and provisioning) measures income 
smoothing.  Thus, the higher the positive coefficient, the more prevalent the strategy of income 
smoothing (Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008).  Change in loans is meant to capture changes in 
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Figure 1
Number of banks' data available in sample
Banks available for event study by year prior to and after expansion.  In order to qualify for the 
event study sample, a bank must have at least one year of data prior to expansion, data at the 
year of expansion (year zero), and at least one year of post‐expansion data.
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provisions that reflect the motivations of the bank management to adequately plan for 
deteriorating asset quality.  Changes in loans should be positively related to provisions, as a 
larger loan portfolio is more susceptible to greater efforts to provision for loan losses.  Equity to 
total assets is meant to capture capital management efforts by the bank (Fonseca & Gonzalez, 
2008). 
 Table 4, which shows the correlations among the variables used in the model, shows an 
inverse (and statistically significant) correlation between provisioning and before-tax and 
provisioning income.  This result is consistent with Fonseca and Gonzalez’s (2008) findings.  A 
lower—or, in this case, negative—correlation between before-tax earnings and provisions would 
indicate that as earnings decrease, so does earnings management.  For this amended bonding 
hypothesis, this could stem from U.S. banking regulators forcing banks to recognize losses in a 
more timely manner.  In addition, there are statistically significant correlations between change 
in loans and with loan-loss reserves and capital.  Thus, as banks originate more loans, they also 
seem to safeguard against any potential loan losses. 
 
The results displayed in Table 5 show the cross-sectional regressions for the sample by 
time period.  As the intention of the study is to evaluate whether the act of expansion into the 
Provisions Before‐Tax and Prov. Income Change in Loans Loan‐Loss Reserves Equity (Capital) GDP Growth
Provisions 1 ‐0.46586 0.10555 0.0797 0.19181 0.15292
0.0011 0.4902 0.5985 0.2016 0.3103
46 46 45 46 46 46
Before‐Tax and Prov. Income ‐0.46586 1 ‐0.19336 0.03469 0.26232 0.03367
0.0011 0.2031 0.819 0.0782 0.8242
46 46 45 46 46 46
Change in Loans 0.10555 ‐0.19336 1 0.43894 0.26823 ‐0.41914
0.4902 0.2031 0.0026 0.0748 0.0042
45 45 45 45 45 45
Loan‐Loss Reserves 0.0797 0.03469 0.43894 1 0.16245 ‐0.21949
0.5985 0.819 0.0026 0.2807 0.1427
46 46 45 46 46 46
Equity 0.19181 0.26232 0.26823 0.16245 1 0.05752
0.2016 0.0782 0.0748 0.2807 0.7042
46 46 45 46 46 46
GDP Growth 0.15292 0.03367 ‐0.41914 ‐0.21949 0.05752 1
0.3103 0.8242 0.0042 0.1427 0.7042
46 46 45 46 46 46
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for event study sample, with Prob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0 and Number of Observations
Table 4
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United States had any effect on earnings management, separating the sample into time periods 
will assess any effect, if one exists at all. It should be noted that the time periods were shortened 
to those periods where the number of banks in the sample were greatest, so as to avoid non-full 
rank issues. 
 While the results are, broadly speaking, inconclusive, some trends can be observed.  As 
mentioned previously, when foreign parent banks choose to enter into the United States, the 
Federal Reserve makes a determination of their capital adequacy.  While capital was not 
available via Datastream as a reliable variable, equity is available.  Thus, equity to total assets is 
used to try to measure capital adequacy.  From period –1 to 0, the t-value for equity increases, as 
does the estimate, suggesting that this increase could be an effect of a supervisory review by U.S. 
banking regulators before the foreign institution is allowed to operate in the United States.  
Furthermore, at time period +3, the estimate for before-tax earnings is positive and significant at 
the 10 percent levels.  This could be indicative of the full effect of being forced to abide by to 
U.S. regulations, because it would indicate a relationship between before-tax earnings and 
provisions that would run counter to what one would expect if banks were managing earnings.  
However, since the estimates for before-tax earnings in other time periods are not statistically 
significant, it would be difficult to infer with any certainty. 
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Further Considerations 
 The most significant challenge to implementing this study was the lack of reliable data 
for a vast number of the financial institutions that are operating in the United States.  Since over 
100 publicly traded foreign parent banks have operations in the United States, one way to further 
strengthen the study would be to collect data individually for each bank so that more banks could 
be added to the panel dataset.  With more banks, the full specification of the Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008) model could be used to evaluate the relationship between earnings management 
and expansion into the United States with more certainty. 
 In addition, given more data, tests specifically centered on those banks that choose to 
expand from weaker regulatory regimes could be examined.  As mentioned previously, most of 
the banks in the event study sample were banks from regulatory regimes with standards similar 
to those of the United States.  Thus, their bonding effect might be more muted than for those 
banks that can strengthen their regulatory standards more substantially.  Furthermore, the United 
Time Period Measure Intercept Pre‐tax and Provision Income Change in Loans Loan‐Loss Reserve Equity (Capital) GDP Growth
Estimate 0.02 0.02 0.04 ‐0.83 0.19 ‐0.18
Std. Error 0.02 0.29 0.05 0.80 0.10 0.11
t ‐ Value 0.74 0.06 0.79 ‐1.05 1.82 ‐1.68
Pr > |t| 0.59 0.96 0.57 0.49 0.32 0.34
Estimate ‐0.01 ‐0.28 ‐0.01 ‐0.70 0.36 0.06
Std. Error 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.44 0.17 0.04
t ‐ Value ‐0.76 ‐1.43 ‐0.51 ‐1.59 2.13 1.68
Pr > |t| 0.53 0.29 0.66 0.25 0.17 0.23
Estimate 0.00 ‐0.29 0.00 ‐0.14 0.11 0.02
Std. Error 0.02 0.36 0.04 0.49 0.27 0.13
t ‐ Value 0.16 ‐0.80 0.01 ‐0.29 0.40 0.14
Pr > |t| 0.89 0.51 0.99 0.80 0.73 0.90
Estimate 0.01 ‐1.23 ‐0.02 0.17 0.05 ‐0.08
Std. Error 0.02 1.76 0.08 0.52 0.28 0.14
t ‐ Value 0.45 ‐0.70 ‐0.18 0.34 0.18 ‐0.59
Pr > |t| 0.70 0.56 0.87 0.77 0.88 0.61
Estimate ‐0.03 ‐1.41 ‐0.16 0.75 0.50 ‐0.29
Std. Error 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.06
t ‐ Value ‐5.31 ‐6.77 ‐4.75 4.51 7.19 ‐4.97
Pr > |t| 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.13
Estimate 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 ‐0.12 0.14
Std. Error 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.08
t ‐ Value 1.17 0.22 0.79 0.14 ‐0.79 1.89
Pr > |t| 0.45 0.86 0.57 0.91 0.57 0.31
3
4
Event study regressions.  Cross‐sectional regressions by time period, from one year prior to expansion into the United States (time 
period = ‐1) to four years after regression (time period = 4)
Table 5: Event Study Regression
‐1
0
1
2
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States may not be an ideal destination for regulatory bonding for banks.  With more data, tests 
could be run for banks that expand into other countries, such as Canada or the United Kingdom. 
 One other factor that could have influenced the results is the relationship among 
regulators.  Publicly traded firms, especially those from advanced economies, aim to provide 
financial reporting that users without special or regulatory access can digest (Koch & Wall, 
2000).  This aim is in line with the concept papers set for financial accounting standards by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
However, this may run counter to the demands of U.S. banking regulators.  Bank 
regulators who rate a financial institution’s prudential strength often prefer more conservative, 
future-oriented loan-loss accounting procedures (Koch & Wall, 2000).  These procedures 
generally aim to serve the regulators’ goal of maintaining financial health at that bank.  As a 
direct consequence of desiring more conservative loan-loss accounting, higher provisions result 
in reducing before-tax income (Koch & Wall, 2000).  Given the two different considerations that 
banks need to make when provisioning for loan losses, there may be unexplored relationships 
between traditional measures of earnings management that may be useful for commercial and 
industrial firms but which may not work when applied to financial institutions.  The negative 
correlation between provisioning and before-tax income seems to suggest that banks use the 
latter approach when setting their provisions for future loan losses.  However, this cannot be said 
for certain with parameter estimates that are not consistently statistically significant. 
Conclusion 
 This paper aims to build upon previous attempts to explain why foreign firms choose to 
expand internationally.  Other studies, such as Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007), have looked at 
firms that cannot finance investment projects internally and need to access capital markets.  To 
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lower their cost of capital, they seek to cross-list their shares internationally in order to adopt the 
regulatory standards of the host country.  With that action, they credibly commit themselves to 
better corporate governance and improve their operating performance (Klapper & Love 2004).   
 In this study, I have sought to understand whether expanding banking operations into the 
United States has any effect on corporate governance, as measured by the ability of bank 
management to report earnings that reflect true operating performance.  Given the limited data 
available, an abridged model based on Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) was used, and results, 
ultimately, were not meaningful.  However, given the unique business of banking, there may be 
other forces at work that could influence motivations for financial reporting standards.  With 
more data, further tests could be run to evaluate alternative ways to gauge bank bonding. 
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